The 1st and 2nd question: the majority of the premium list as voted on and increase in minimum threshold
The current electoral law of the House and Senate provide for a system of proportional representation with majority bonus. This prize is awarded on a national basis to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate on a regional basis. It is attributed to the "single list" or the "coalition of lists" that gets the most votes.
The fact that the lists be allowed to get together to get the prize has meant that, in the last election, have formed two large coalitions composed of many parties in-house. And the fragmentation is greatly increased.
The 1st and 2nd question (valid for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) it is proposed the ' repeal of linked lists and the possibility of awarding the prize to the majority of coalitions lists .
In case of a positive outcome of the referendum , the consequence is that the majority of the premium is attributed to a single list (and not the coalition's list) that obtained the largest number of seats .
A second effect of referendum is the following: repeal the rule on coalitions would also raise the thresholds for the dam. To obtain parliamentary representation, that is, the lists must still reach a consensus in the House of 4% and 8% in the Senate.
In short, the most votes gets the prize list that ensures the majority of seats up for grabs, the lists get smaller, however, adequate representation, provided that exceed the barrier. Upon completion
repeal, will remain in force the rules concerning the use the "head of the political force" (the candidate for prime minister) and the Programme election .
political and institutional effects of 1st and 2nd question
The election resulting from referendum push the current political actors to pursue, since the pre-election , construction of a single group, making ambiguous and unworkable solutions supporting the regrouping in the party system. You can open, for Italy, a prospect tends bipartisan. The fragmentation will be reduced drastically. There being no more coalitions will disappear from the current schizophrenia of collective identity coalition and identity of individual parties in the coalition. With the effect that the parties are together on election day and the day after, fight in the coalition.
The board will one symbol, only one name and one list for each organization that is a candidate to get the majority of the premium.
The policy components of each list can not claim a right to autonomy because, in the face to voters, were presented as single line-up, one. No one can claim their "quota" of consensus. It will be very difficult to explain to them tears in the majority. The dissolution of Parliament once it has entered into crisis, a majority voted compactly by voters could be politically very likely.
L’eliminazione di composite e rissose coalizioni imporrà al sistema politico una sterzata esattamente opposta all’attuale. Piuttosto che l’inarrestabile frammentazione in liste e listine, minacce di scissioni e continue trattative tra i partiti, il nuovo sistema imporrà una notevole semplificazione, lasciando comunque un diritto di rappresentanza anche alle forze che non intendano correre per ottenere una maggioranza di Governo, purché abbiano un consenso significativo e superino la soglia di sbarramento.
Il 3° quesito: abrogazione delle candidature multiple e la cooptazione oligarchica della classe politica
Un terzo quesito referendario colpisce un altro aspetto di scandalo. Oggi la possibilità di candidature in più circoscrizioni (anche tutte!) dà un enorme potere al candidato eletto in più luoghi (il “plurieletto”). Questi, optando per uno dei vari seggi ottenuti, permette che i primi dei candidati “non eletti” della propria lista in quella circoscrizione gli subentrino nel seggio al quale rinunzia. Egli così, di fatto, dispone del destino degli altri candidati la cui elezione dipende dalla propria scelta. Se sceglie per sé il seggio “A” favorisce l’elezione del primo dei non eletti nella circoscrizione “B”; se sceglie il seggio “B” favorisce il primo dei non eletti nella circoscrizione “A”. In the current term, this phenomenon of truly pathological, involving about 1 / 3 of parliament. In other words, 1 / 3 of parliament are chosen after the elections by those who already has been elected and become MPs for favors received. A glaring example of co-option!
's inevitable that such a discipline inevitably leads to attitudes of subservience and subordination to the availability of cooptandi, attitudes that harm the dignity and the very nature of the parliamentary function. Moreover, the parliamentary successors (1 / 3, as stated above) owe their election not to their ability, but fidelity to a notable, that rewards them choosing to replace it.
With the approval of the 3rd question the possibility of multiple applications will be repealed in the House and the Senate.
